Few people outside Germany are familiar with the caricature of
themselves that many Germans hold in their minds. Far from the
aggressive bully of 20th-century war propaganda, the perfectionist
engineer of Madison Avenue car advertisements, or the rule-following
know-it-all of the silver screen, the German many picture today is a
sleepy-headed character clad in nightgown and cap. Sometimes clutching a
candle, this German cuts a naive, forlorn figure, bewildered by the
surrounding world.
This figure is not new. On the contrary, referred to as “Der deutsche
Michel” or “the German Michel,” it was popularised in the 19th century
as a character whose limited perspective causes him to shun great ideas,
eschew change, and aspire only to a decent, quiet, and comfortable
life.
But Michel has now made a comeback. And who can blame him? Germany now
boasts a booming economy, near full employment, rising wages, and
content unions. The financial crisis is long forgotten, public budgets
are under control; and the 2015 influx of migrants has been relatively
well managed.
What bad news there is – industrial scandals (like that at Volkswagen),
airline bankruptcies, endlessly delayed infrastructure projects – does
little to dampen the general sense of safety and well-being enjoyed by
Germany’s Michels. The only real threat, it seems, is the world outside
Germany’s borders.
In this sense, last autumn’s election campaign was perfectly suited to
Germany’s Michels. “A land where we live well and happily,” the campaign
slogan of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU),
resonated with them, as did the rather provincial and mostly empty
messages of rival parties. With the exception of the right-wing populist
Alternative fur Deutschland (AfD), the parties displayed a rote
civility and drowsy acceptance of consensus that pacified the
electorate.
After the election, the real politicking began, but even then, pains
were taken to obscure those activities from Germany’s Michels. Indeed,
though party officials had been in place for some time, they waited
until the votes were cast before putting their cards on the table, and
even then did so behind closed doors. Even the leaks from these
closed-door coalition talks were so well managed that they created the
illusion that the “Sondierungsgesprache” – that is, the preparatory
talks among party officials – were politically rather harmless.
But Germany’s political class, like its ordinary Michels, are in denial.
The soporific federal elections, the breakdown of coalition talks among
the CDU, its Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union (CSU),
the Greens, and the Free Democrats (FDP), and the timid dance between
the CDU and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) since then all point to a
serious deficit in German politics.
The truth is that the various party platforms, meant to inform the
electorate and provide a basis for coalition talks, reveal a shocking
lack of imagination and paucity of new ideas. Second-order issues are
presented as red lines, with largely technical questions – for example,
about refugee family reunions, a new health insurance scheme no one
asked for (Burgerversicherung), or the role of the federal government in
funding education – taking centre stage.
Considering the state of Europe and the world – and the hopes many
outsiders are pinning on German leadership – these issues seem rather
marginal. But the real problem is that they are distracting from larger
issues relating to, say, the euro, security and defence, migration,
infrastructure, and taxation.
Lacking any forward-looking political visions, German politics has
degenerated to tactical plays being carried out by established players.
The CDU, in a War of the Roses with the CSU, can live neither with or
without Merkel, while the SPD is unsure of itself and fears further
political decline. None of this bodes well for a country whose
parliament has already been diminished, after these three parties,
during their eight years forming a coalition government, marginalised
the opposition and failed to build up new leadership cadres.
Coalition agreements in Germany have always been elaborate documents of a
quasi-contractual nature. But there is a growing tendency to plan out
four years of governing, with leaders then using legislative periods not
to debate laws, but rather to enact previously agreed policies.
Moreover, no major reform has been successfully implemented in Germany
since the 2000s, when Chancellor Gerhard Schroder pushed through
labour-market reforms. No forward-looking reforms of the calibre of
Schroder’s Agenda 2010 were even attempted under Merkel in over a
decade.
The CDU/CSU and the SPD are now pursuing a grand coalition that would
keep Germany roughly on the same path as the last eight years. And, in
fact, the 28-page agreement that will allow formal coalition talks to
proceed is overly detailed, technocratic, unambitious, and lacks vision.
It is thus unsurprising that, though CDU/CSU and SPD negotiators have
celebrated the deal as a breakthrough, many, especially in the SPD, are
unhappy with the outcome, with some calling for a renegotiation. The SPD
now faces a choice: at its upcoming special party congress this
weekend, its leaders must decide whether to join yet another grand
coalition government that promises more of the same or move into
opposition, probably triggering new elections.
But there is another option, which many have ignored: a CDU-led minority
government, with Merkel as chancellor. Freed of stifling coalition
agreements with a reluctant SPD or a coldly calculating FDP, Merkel
could choose her cabinet based on competence and vision, rather than
party politics. She could even appoint ministers from other parties.
Most important, Merkel could finally tackle the important issues that
have fallen by the wayside in recent years, to which the current
coalition agreement pays only lip service. This means cooperating with
French President Emmanuel Macron to move the European project forward;
modernising Germany’s public administration system; preparing the labour
force for digitisation; and tackling immigration issues.
Parliament is integral to success on any of these fronts. Mainstream
parties must embrace the kind of open and constructive debate that
nurtured parliamentary democracy in Germany’s early years, rather than
remaining focused on political tactics.
Michel may prefer the modest policy initiatives and incrementalism that
have characterised Merkel’s chancellorships. But a minority government
forced to muster coalitions of the willing to address the critical
issues confronting Germany and Europe could escape the constraints of
Michel’s expectations, freeing German politics from party tacticians and
enabling real and much-needed reform. In other words, the modicum of
political insecurity Germany faces today may well be just what the
country needs to give rise to new ideas and voices, and a better future.
– Project Syndicate
* Helmut K Anheier is president and professor of Sociology at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin.
File photo of German Chancellor Angela Merkel delivering a press statement in Meseberg Palace in Meseberg, eastern Germany, on May 20, 2017.