No one was seriously hurt, but the January 5 incident has renewed major questions about quality control at Boeing and its top suppliers.
In its 19-page report, the NTSB says four bolts that were supposed to hold the door plug in place were not recovered. Nevertheless, investigators say "the observed damage patterns and absence of contact damage" on the door panel and plane itself indicate the four bolts were "missing" before the door plug was ejected from the plane.
The door plug was originally installed by contractor Spirit AeroSystems in Wichita, Kansas, and then shipped to Boeing's factory in Renton, Washington, for assembly. Once it arrived in Washington, the NTSB says damaged rivets were discovered on the fuselage that required the door plug to be opened for repairs. After that work was completed by Spirit AeroSystems personnel at the Boeing plant, the bolts were not reinstalled, according to photo evidence provided to the NTSB by Boeing.
The report does not say who was responsible for the failure to ensure the bolts were reinstalled.
The incident has touched off another crisis for Boeing. The troubled plane-maker was still working to rebuild public trust after 346 people died in two 737 Max 8 jets that crashed in 2018 and 2019.
In a statement, Boeing said it would review the NTSB's findings expeditiously.
"Whatever final conclusions are reached, Boeing is accountable for what happened," Boeing CEO Dave Calhoun said in a statement. "An event like this must not happen on an airplane that leaves our factory. We simply must do better for our customers and their passengers."
The NTSB investigation is ongoing and may take a year or more before a final report is completed.
The Alaska Airlines 737 Max 9 incident came up during a congressional hearing on Capitol Hill on Tuesday. The administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Michael Whitaker, told lawmakers on the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee that this latest 737 accident has created several issues for the FAA.
"One, what's wrong with this airplane? But two, what's going on with the production at Boeing?" Whitaker said. "There have been issues in the past. And they don't seem to be getting resolved. So we feel like we need to have a heightened level of oversight to really get after that."
Whitaker says the FAA has sent about 20 inspectors to Boeing's Washington facilities, and six to the Spirit AeroSystems factory in Wichita, Kansas, where the 737 fuselages are produced. And he said some inspectors may have to remain at those factories permanently.
"Going forward, we will have more boots on the ground closely scrutinising and monitoring production and manufacturing activities," Whitaker said. "I do anticipate we will want to keep people on the ground there. We don't know how many yet. But we do think that presence will be warranted."
The FAA had already taken an unprecedented step ordering Boeing to not increase its 737 Max production rate beyond 38 jets each month — until the FAA is satisfied Boeing's quality control measures have improved.
The FAA is in the midst of a six-week audit of production at both facilities and an employee culture survey at Boeing. Whitaker testified that the agency will wait until those are complete before making any decisions about a permanent inspection plan.
Tim Clark, the president of Emirates, has joined a chorus of airline executives in warning that Boeing is running out of time to restore its reputation following a series of safety and manufacturing blunders.
In an interview with the Financial Times, Clark said he had seen a “progressive decline” in Boeing’s standards, which he put down to long-running management and governance missteps, including prioritising profit over engineering excellence.
“They’ve got to get their manufacturing processes under review so there are no corners cut etc. I’m sure Dave Calhoun and Stan Deal are on that,” he added, referring to Boeing’s CEO and head of commercial airplanes respectively. “This is the last chance saloon.”
Clark isn’t the first airline boss to criticize Boeing since part of the fuselage of a 737 Max 9 blew out mid-flight in early January. In an interview with CNBC last month, United CEO Scott Kirby lamented Boeing’s “consistent manufacturing challenges.”
“I think the Max 9 grounding is probably the straw that broke the camel’s back for us,” he said. “We’re going to build a plan that doesn’t have the Max 10 in it,” he added, referring to Boeing’s newer, larger 737 model. The CEOs of American and Alaska have also voiced their frustration.
Here in the Middle East, Clark is one of the most high-profile figures in aviation, having held senior roles at Emirates since the 1980s, and the Dubai-based airline is one of Boeing’s biggest customers. In November, Emirates placed an order for 95 wide-body Boeing 777 and 787 jets, used for long-haul flights, valued at $52bn in total.
Clark said that Emirates would, for the first time, send its own engineers to observe the production process of the 777 at Boeing and its supplier Spirit AeroSystems — something unprecedented in a typical manufacturer-airline relationship.
“The fact that we’re having to do that is testament to what has happened,” he told the Financial Times. Boeing “needs a root-and-branch look at how it goes about producing aeroplanes,” he added.
“Will Boeing restore itself to its former glory? Of course it will. Will Boeing continue to produce and design great aeroplanes, well-put together, reliable, for the customer base? I’m sure they will. But they’ve got to put the house in order at the moment. And this is a major shift in the priorities.”
Ryanair — Europe’s largest airline and another of Boeing’s biggest customers — said last week that it was putting more of its own engineers in factories that build Boeing planes to run extra checks.
CEO Michael O’Leary said he has “a lot of confidence” in Calhoun and chief financial officer Brian West to turn the company around.
The author is an aviation analyst. Twitter handle: @AlexInAir
