Finding a new French majority

French President Emmanuel Macron was first elected in 2017 on a promise to end the often-artificial divisions between left and right. France had become tired of theatrical posturing between adversaries who overplayed their differences during electoral campaigns, only to end up, once in power, governing in fairly similar ways. Macron’s brand of radical centrism was meant to end the grandstanding, draw on good ideas from both sides of the political spectrum, and govern accordingly. It intended to turn the opposition between left and right into a historical relic.

Seven years later, the outcome of the general election this month indicates that, if anything, France is even more polarised than it was in 2017. The right has moved further to the right, and the formerly dominant Gaullist camp is reduced to fewer than 50 MPs squeezed between the extreme right and Macron’s centrist Ensemble (Together) coalition. Part of what remains of Saturday’s right is divided between Macron supporters and opponents.

Meanwhile, the once-eviscerated left has rebuilt itself – and moved much further to the left. Rebranded as Nouveau Front Populaire (New Popular Front, NFP), it is now the largest of the three main camps in the National Assembly, though it does not command an absolute majority and is far from homogeneous.

Economic manifestos are indicative of this polarisation. Although France has the highest level of public spending of all advanced economies, the NFP’s program envisions €150bn ($163bn) of new public spending – 4-5% of GDP – financed by an equivalent amount of taxes. The Rassemblement National (National Rally, RN), Marine Le Pen’s far-right party, has softened the edges of its economic plans, but still is considering exiting Europe’s single market for electricity or reversing Macron’s latest pension reform.

Differences regarding the green transition are strong, with the RN campaigning to reverse it while the NFP would speed it up. And they are extreme for migration policy, with RN becoming engulfed in controversy after floating the idea of excluding bi-national citizens from access to certain public-service positions.

Far from having reduced political polarisation, therefore, Macronism has had the paradoxical effect of discrediting centrist policies and pushing opponents toward extremism. This does not bode well for the future of French policymaking.

Was this outcome inevitable? In part, it reflects a governing style that deprived opponents of political oxygen and left them little choice but to search for refuge in equally radical and mutually opposed corners. But, as is true in the United States or other developed countries, French polarisation has much deeper economic and sociological roots.

Despite extensive social protection, a high degree of redistribution, and the major contribution of public services to limiting inequality of access to health, education, and other essential amenities, France is a divided country where many citizens feel left out. Moreover, the voting system encourages radicalism, especially on the left.

To survive politically, social democrats are compelled to enter an electoral alliance with the far-left La France Insoumise (France Unbowed), which they oppose on a range of economic, social, and foreign-policy issues. Although the Socialists campaigned for June’s European Parliament election on a pro-Europe, social democratic platform and attracted some 40% more voters than France Unbowed, they had to sign on to a fiscally irresponsible tax-and-spend platform for the national election.

Things may change. With all three camps (left, centre, and far right) far from holding an absolute majority, some sort of coalition must be formed to establish a stable government. Moreover, each camp contains three or four factions. For example, the NFP comprises France Unbowed, the Socialists, and the Greens, which may split. The game is therefore very open.

Departing from his past behaviour, Macron acknowledged the new electoral landscape and the corresponding political logic. In an open letter to French citizens after the election’s second round, he called for a "sincere and loyal dialogue” between political parties with the aim of building a "solid, necessarily plural majority.” Although other political camps rejected his proposal out of hand, it may end up being implemented for the lack of an alternative.

For a new majority to be formed, however, several conditions must be met. The left, which so far has played the role of the winner, must accept that coalition partners are unlikely to subscribe to its radical economic programme. And to prevent the next government from being vulnerable to a parliamentary ambush, the voting system must be changed so that parties can compete on their own in future elections and are no longer held hostage by their political allies. The issue is political, not constitutional, as the French system makes it possible to change the voting system by simple majority.

The more fundamental challenge is to respond to the frustration and the grievances of those who voted for the far right. About a third of French voters supported RN in the parliamentary election, and the tally was much larger outside big cities. Entire regions are now dominated by the far right.

Whether or not this pattern can be reversed is the overriding question for the future of France – and of Europe. If the results of France’s latest election are not to be a mere temporary reprieve, political manoeuvring will not suffice. Only deeds will convince alienated voters that their voice counts. — Project Syndicate

• Jean Pisani-Ferry, a senior fellow at the Brussels-based think tank Bruegel and a senior non-resident fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, holds the Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa chair at the European University Institute.