Is it the hour of Europe again?

“If one problem can be solved by the Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem,” Luxembourg’s then-foreign minister, Jacques Poos, asserted in 1991. The Soviet Union was formally, and largely peacefully, dissolved at the end of that year, but ethnic tensions in the Balkans were on the rise, and Poos was adamant that, since Yugoslavia was a European country, Europe, not the United States, should manage the growing crisis there. “This is the hour of Europe,” he proudly declared. And yet, in the years that followed, Yugoslavia endured a bloody disintegration process, and Europe proved incapable of doing much about it.
Today, another European country is being torn apart: Ukraine. So, by Poos’ logic, it is up to Europe to “save” it. Will Europe prove more effective this time around?
There is a grain of truth in US President-elect Donald Trump’s crude accusations that Europe is not sufficiently self-reliant when it comes to security. In fact, nobody in Europe harbours the illusion that Europe alone can solve the Ukrainian “problem”; the US was always expected to take a leading role. But this reality should not obscure Europe’s contributions to Ukraine.
According to the Kiel Institute’s Ukraine support tracker, Europe – including the European Union, its member states, Norway, and the United Kingdom – has overtaken the US as the leading source of aid to Ukraine, with about €125bn ($128bn) having been allocated as of late last year, compared to $88bn from the US. This sum included just as much military aid as the US provided (about €60bn). Moreover, Europe has already committed another €120bn, to be disbursed in the next few years, whereas future US aid is in doubt.
When one considers the size of the donors’ economies and military budgets, neither contribution is all that impressive. For the US – where output is running at $27tn per year – $88bn over almost three years amounts to a rounding error, and $60bn represents 7.5% of total US military spending, which now runs at over $800bn annually. Europe’s economy is somewhat smaller, but its total aid to Ukraine (including aid from Norway
and the United Kingdom) has still cost less than 0.6% of GDP. The implication
is clear: financial considerations are hardly an insurmountable barrier to “saving” Ukraine.
Things are looking reasonably good for Ukraine politically, too. Even as the war has dragged on for more than three years, public support for the country has held up well. While Europeans’ enthusiasm for sending Ukraine aid has waned, as the David-versus-Goliath narrative that proved so rousing in the war’s early days has lost its impact, popular majorities in almost every European country still favour continuing support for Ukraine.
EU policymakers regard it as self-evident that a Russian victory would threaten the Union’s very existence. European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen has been especially clear on this, and has spearheaded an unprecedented array of sanctions and other measures aimed at compelling Russia to change course.
Crucially, most national-level European policymakers share the conviction that supporting Ukraine is in their countries’ interests. Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has made clear his disdain for the values and norms for which the EU stands, is already conducting a shadow war with the West. If he is allowed to claim Ukrainian territories by force, what is to stop him from pressing forward with his ambition to redraw the map of Europe?
This risk preoccupies not only Ukraine’s closest neighbours, but also those for whom, to adapt Neville Chamberlain’s infamous phrase, Ukraine is a faraway country of which people know little. This shared threat perception explains why, in late 2023, 26 EU member governments pushed through the decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine. Such a step should be possible only with unanimous approval, but Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán refused to back the move, so EU leaders asked him to leave the room while the vote took place.
This episode highlighted how EU rules, which often require unanimity, can impede timely and effective responses to internal challenges and external threats. But it also showed that an overwhelming majority, if sufficiently determined, can avoid being stymied by mavericks from small countries. In fact, a large coalition of EU member states is now considering establishing a €500 billion joint fund for defence projects outside the EU treaties, so that it is not subject to veto.
No amount of European support can fully substitute for the political and military weight of the US. But when Trump attempts to negotiate a “peace deal” that benefits Putin at Ukraine’s expense – Europe must be prepared to rise to the hour and provide Ukraine with the political and financial support it needs to sustain its resistance. While Europe cannot decide the war’s outcome, it can improve Ukraine’s prospects substantially. Its resolve will affect the calculations of both Trump and Putin. — Project Syndicate

• Daniel Gros is Director of the Institute for European Policymaking at Bocconi University.