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Tuesday, February 10, 2026 | Daily Newspaper published by GPPC Doha, Qatar.

Search Results for "covid 19" (360 articles)

Federal Reserve Bank Chair Jerome Powell.
Business

Jerome Powell: The careful Fed chair standing firm against Trump

US Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell has generally avoided escalation in the face of Donald Trump's relentless criticism — but in recent months, the central banker has become a rare figure to publicly resist his attacks.The change of tack was especially pronounced on Sunday night, when Powell accused the Trump administration of threatening him with prosecution to push the Fed into cutting interest rates. He warned that a new Department of Justice investigation targeting him was a threat to the central bank's independence."What made the statement so powerful is how rare it is," Jason Furman, a top economic adviser to former US president Barack Obama, told AFP. "A year ago, Powell got a question about Donald Trump and the Fed, and gave a one-word answer," added Furman, now a professor at Harvard University. "He has not wanted to be baited into a fight."The fact that Powell felt the need to respond forcefully now "conveys just how serious the issue is," Furman said.Powell, a 72-year-old former investment banker, took the helm at the Fed in 2018 after he was tapped by Trump to replace Janet Yellen. It was Trump's first presidency.Powell then withstood months of withering attacks from Trump for raising interest rates.When Covid-19 took hold in 2020, the Fed rapidly slashed its benchmark rate to zero and rolled out new support measures, moves that helped to prevent a more severe downturn.His tenure won him praise and criticism from all sides as he maintained the central bank's independence.Over that tumultuous period, Powell, who is also called "Jay," managed to forge consensus among the diverse members of the Fed's rate-setting committee.In 2021, the wealthy Republican with no formal economics training was nominated by Democratic President Joe Biden to lead the Fed for a second term.He proceeded to oversee a series of sharp rate hikes in 2022 to curb surging inflation after the pandemic, before beginning to cautiously lower rates again in 2024 and 2025 as he eyed the price effects from Trump's sweeping new tariffs.Less than a year before his time as Fed chair expires in May 2026, however, Powell has again come under fire as Trump lashes out at him for not lowering interest rates more aggressively.Trump, now in his second presidency, has called Powell a "numbskull" and "moron," and in July went so far as to suggest he could be dismissed for "fraud" over the handling of a $2.5bn renovation project at the Fed's headquarters.Since Trump returned to the White House, Powell has proven willing to compromise in certain areas, such as by pulling back on the Fed's work on climate change.But "Trump pushed him too far this time, and he came out with all guns blazing," Brookings senior fellow David Wessel said of the Fed chief's sharp rebuke of the Justice Department probe.Wessel expects the forceful response will cement Powell's legacy as "a Fed chair with a spine.""He will be seen as the guy who stood up for the independence of the Fed, and the rule of law," Wessel told AFP.Already, Powell made headlines when he appeared with Trump in July as the president toured the under-renovation Fed buildings while criticising cost overruns.In a brief exchange in front of reporters, Powell corrected Trump in real-time as the president claimed the price tag for the revamp had ballooned to $3.1bn.The usually stoic Fed chair was seen shaking his head on camera while Trump spoke, and responding: "I haven't heard that from anybody."Prior to his appointment to the central bank in 2012 by then-president Obama, Powell was a scholar at the Bipartisan Policy Center think tank.The native of Washington served in the Treasury Department, in charge of financial institutions, for a brief period under Republican president George H W Bush. 

3D printing
Business

Qatar’s 3D printing market poised for QR182mn surge by 2028

Qatar’s 3D printing market is poised for significant expansion, with projections indicating an increase from “QR78mn” in 2023 to an estimated “QR182mn” by 2028, according to Qatar Development Bank’s (QDB) top executive.In QDB’s ‘Qatar’s 3D Printing Sector’ report, CEO Abdulrahman Hesham al-Sowaidi stated that this trajectory reflects a robust compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of “18.4%,” highlighting the rising demand and adoption of 3D printing technologies across various sectors in the country.Al-Sowaidi noted that QDB continues to serve as a growth partner for entrepreneurs, moving projects from ideation to fruition within an increasingly sophisticated innovation ecosystem.“As part of Qatar’s efforts to develop its private sector and bring progress to the country’s entrepreneurship, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and innovation ecosystems towards the realisation of its national vision for 2030, Qatar Development Bank continues to advance its role as the entrepreneur’s and SME’s growth partner from ideation to fruition,” al-Sowaidi stated in the report.Citing recent industrial findings, QDB reported that 3D printing technology is rapidly reshaping the local manufacturing landscape by introducing a transformative approach to product creation. In Qatar, the report pointed out that the technology is expected to revolutionise manufacturing processes, offering significant benefits to vital industries, ranging from construction to healthcare.“A key focus of [the] report is the implications for SMEs in Qatar. By adopting 3D printing, SMEs can unlock new avenues for innovation, reduce production costs, and enhance their competitiveness, enabling them to establish a stronger presence in both local and global markets,” it stated.Al-Sowaidi stated that in the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) region, there is a growing emphasis on the adoption of advanced manufacturing technologies aimed at modernising supply chains. As industries evolve in response to rapid technological advancements and the changing global market, 3D printing has emerged as a significant enabler of this transformation, the report noted.On a global scale, the QDB reported that the industry has demonstrated remarkable resilience and growth, with the market size tripling from “QR21.96bn” in 2016 to “QR65.8bn” by 2022. While the COVID-19 pandemic briefly slowed economic activity, the urgent demand for medical equipment during the crisis highlighted the unique production capabilities of 3D printing.“This growth has been influenced by a combination of global economic factors, political changes, and technological advancements. Furthermore, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the industry faced reduced demand due to a global slowdown in economic activity. However, the simultaneous need for medical equipment highlighted the production capabilities and quality of 3D printing, underscoring its crucial role in responding to urgent demands,” stated the report.Citing the global investment landscape, QDB reported that the 3D printing industry has experienced “growing venture capital (VC) investments,” with a CAGR of “19.1%, rising from “QR1.42bn” in 2017 to “QR4.06bn” in 2023. “The momentum from 2021 carried into 2022, with an additional QR1.88bn invested, primarily in core technologies and specialised applications,” according to the report.The report stated, “This upward investment trend reflects an emphasis on niche applications and advancements in core 3D printing technologies, as industry players are increasingly targeting specialised sectors, such as healthcare, energy, and aerospace. Notably, the average investment size reached a record QR98.45mn in 2022, signalling strong investor confidence in established companies poised for growth.”  

A BYD Yangwang U9 is on display at the Essen Motor Show in Essen, western Germany (file). Chinese EV giant BYD — which last year overtook Elon Musk's Tesla to become the world's largest electric carmaker — saw its German sales rise over 700% to more than 23,000 cars, giving it 0.8% of the overall auto market.
Business

EV sales rebound in Germany as Chinese brands make inroads

Electric vehicle sales rebounded strongly in Germany in 2025, official data showed Tuesday, with Chinese manufacturers making inroads from a low base in the EU's largest economy despite tariffs.EV sales rose 43.2% last year to 545,142 in total, the KBA federal transport authority said, representing 19.1% of all new cars sold.Chinese EV giant BYD — which last year overtook Elon Musk's Tesla to become the world's largest electric carmaker — saw its German sales rise over 700% to more than 23,000 cars, giving it 0.8% of the overall auto market."International vehicle manufacturers with affordable battery electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids have contributed disproportionately to growth in these segments," said Imelda Labbe, head of the VDIK foreign carmakers' lobby in Germany.The European Union in 2024 introduced higher tariffs on Chinese-made electric cars, alleging that they benefitted from unfair subsidies.That has not stopped sales of Chinese cars rising across the bloc, with the country's carmakers keen to crack foreign markets amid cut-throat competition at home.Rising EV sales are also some rare good news for Germany's beleaguered carmakers, which have invested heavily in the technology in recent years, and are seeking to comply with European Union environmental rules.Though the European Commission in December proposed scrapping a planned 2035 ban on new combustion-engine vehicles, carmakers would still have to cut emissions by 90% from 2021 levels under its latest plan, and need to see dramatic sales growth.The rise in EV sales last year comes after a fall of almost 30% in 2024 following the withdrawal of government subsidies, and Germany's electric car market is still smaller than optimists had hoped for."We haven't seen a real boom yet," EY analyst Constantin Gall said. "The hoped-for surge in e-mobility in Germany is proving to be much more protracted and difficult than expected."After the decline in the market in 2024, the government said in December it would introduce subsidies again.Some motorists will be able to benefit from €5,000 ($5,855) for the purchase of new EVs or hybrids so long as their components are largely made in Germany.But industry figures say that better charging infrastructure and cheaper power would be needed to really boost EVs and warned that the planned subsidy would have limited impact."The state subsidies will only be available to households on low and middle incomes," Gall said. "But it is high-earners who tend to buy new electric cars."Weak sales at home have compounded the challenges facing Germany's car industry.It was already contending with the costs of investing in EVs and cratering sales in key market China even before US President Donald Trump last year slapped tariffs on cars and auto parts.Volkswagen, Europe's largest carmaker, is in the process of cutting 35,000 jobs in Germany by 2030 under a deal reached with unions in a bid to slash costs.Overall car sales in Germany rose just 1.4% last year to about 2.9mn vehicles, the KBA said — roughly 750,000 fewer than were sold in 2019 before the Covid pandemic and Germany's economy sank into stagnation."The weak economy, increasing job insecurity and the multitude of political, social and economic crises are taking their toll," Gall said. 

The Cuban national flag flies at half-mast outside the US Embassy in Havana. Havana declared two days of national mourning as of January 5 after a total of 32 Cubans were killed during the US attack on Caracas that culminated in the capture of Venezuela's president Nicolas Maduro. (AFP)
International

Toppling of Venezuela's Maduro stirs fear in Cubans

Cubans weary from years of economic crisis, shortages of basic supplies and regular power blackouts, fear the US attack on Venezuela, a leftist ideological ally and its main oil supplier, will see life get even tougher.After American forces seized Venezuela's leader Nicolas Maduro in an early-morning raid, US President Donald Trump over the weekend issued threats to other leftist leaders in the region and said he thought Cuba was "ready to fall."He played down the need for US military action on the island, saying it would be hard for Havana to "hold out" without Venezuelan oil, and "it looks like it's going down.""2026 is going to be tough, very tough," Axel Alfonso, a 53-year-old working as a driver for a state enterprise, told AFP in the capital Havana."If Venezuela is the main supplier, at least of oil, it's going to get a bit complicated," said Alfonso who, like the vast majority of Cubans, has lived his whole life under a bruising US trade embargo in place since 1962.The communist-run island has seen 13 US administrations come and go, some more punishing than others."We've been fighting for 60 years, and we have to keep going," Alfonso said.'Uncertainty'Located roughly 90 miles (about 145 kilometers) from the coast of Florida, Cuba's last major economic test followed the implosion in 1991 of the Soviet Union, a major trade partner and source of credit.It survived by opening up to tourism and foreign investment.Since 2000, Havana has increasingly relied on Venezuelan oil under a deal struck with Maduro's predecessor Hugo Chavez, in exchange for Cuban doctors, teachers, and sports coaches.In the last quarter of 2025, Venezuela sent Cuba an average of 30,000 - 35,000 barrels a day, "which represents 50 percent of the island's oil deficit," Jorge Pinon, an energy expert and researcher at the University of Texas, told AFP.The number was much higher 10 years ago, slashed by the global oil price crash that sent Venezuela's own economy into turmoil.For the past six years, Cuba has been mired in an ever-deepening crisis caused by a toxic combination of tighter US sanctions, poor domestic management of the economy and the collapse of tourism due to the Covid-19 pandemic.GDP has fallen by 11 percent in five years and the government faces a severe shortage of currency to pay for basic social services: electricity, healthcare and supplying subsidized food and other basic goods that many Cubans have learned to rely on.Economic hardship was a trigger for the unprecedented anti-government demonstrations of July 11, 2021, when thousands of Cubans took to the streets shouting "We are hungry" and "Freedom!"Since then, ever more frequent and longer power cuts and shortages of food and medicine have deepened discontent and led to sporadic, smaller protests, quickly contained by the government.Now, many fear that the loss of Venezuelan oil will make matters even worse."We're living in a moment of uncertainty," attorney Daira Perez, 30, told AFP.No bailoutPinon said it was "not clear whether shipments of Venezuelan oil to Cuba will continue," especially in the context of the recent US seizure of oil tankers in the Caribbean.And he highlighted that "Cuba doesn't have the resources to buy that volume on international markets, nor a political partner to bail it out."Despite concerns for the future, long-suffering Cubans put on a brave face."He (Trump) keeps making tough threats," said Havana resident Roberto Brown, 80, who was a young man during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis that brought the world to the brink of nuclear war."We already told him once: we're 90 miles away, and a long-range missile from over there reaches here, but the one from here reaches there too," said Brown. 

Kiyoshi Kimura poses with the 243kg bluefin tuna auctioned for a record 510mn yen ($3.24mn) at his sushi restaurant in Tokyo, Japan, Monday.
International

'Tuna King' pays record $3.2mn for bluefin at Tokyo auction

A Japanese sushi entrepreneur paid a record $3.2mn for a giant bluefin tuna Monday at an annual prestigious new year auction in Tokyo's main fish market, smashing the previous all-time high.Dave Gershman at the Pew Charitable Trusts' international fisheries team used news of the auction to highlight that stocks of Pacific bluefin tuna were improving after being "near collapse".Self-styled "Tuna King" Kiyoshi Kimura's sushi restaurant chain paid the top price for the 243kg fish that was caught off Japan's northern coast."I'd thought we would be able to buy a little cheaper, but the price soared before you knew it," Kimura said after the pre-dawn auction at Tokyo's main fish market."I was surprised at the price...I hope that by eating auspicious tuna, as many people as possible will feel energised," he told reporters.The 510.3mn yen price at the new year's auction was the highest since comparable data started being collected in 1999.The previous high was 333.6mn yen for a 278kg bluefin in 2019, after the fish market moved from its traditional Tsukiji area in central Tokyo to a more modern facility.The top bidder last year paid 207mn yen for a 276kg bluefin.Shortly after this year's auction, the tuna was butchered and turned into sushi, selling for around 500 yen ($3) per roll."I feel like I've begun the year in a good way after eating something so auspicious as the year starts," 19-year-old Minami Sugiyama from a table in one of Kimura's restaurants in Tsukiji.Fellow customer Kiyoshi Nishimura agreed. "Even without dipping it in soy sauce, there's sweetness. And the richness, the texture... it just makes you feel happy," the 40-year-old Shinto priest said.During the Covid-19 pandemic the new year tunas commanded only a fraction of their usual top prices as restaurants scaled back operations.Gershman said in an emailed statement that a 2017 recovery plan "is working, and if decision makers take further action in 2026, the future for Pacific bluefin will be bright"."This year, fisheries managers from Japan, the US, Korea, and other countries from across the Pacific who target bluefin should agree on a long-term, sustainable management plan that would lock in a healthy population and ensure that the species never again faces the overfishing of the past," he added. 

Gulf Times
Business

Collaboration between academia and government seen as key to Qatar’s innovation

Collaboration between academia and government is essential for driving innovation in Qatar, according to Dr Georgios Dimitropoulos, professor and associate dean for Research at the College of Law, Hamad Bin Khalifa University (HBKU). “Very little can happen without the nexus between academia and government,” Dimitropoulos said during the Ibtechar Majlis panel discussion, where he explained that universities provide the research depth and methodological rigour, while government offers the scale, resources, and policy frameworks needed to translate ideas into practice. Dimitropoulos pointed out that the nexus between research institutions and public authorities “is the foundation for credibility, adoption, and long-term success in innovation.” Citing historical examples to illustrate the power of this partnership, Dimitropoulos said: “Think of the Manhattan Project, the development of Covid vaccines, or even the Internet. None of these breakthroughs would have been possible without academia and government working hand in hand.” Dimitropoulos added that Qatar’s own Artificial Intelligence (AI) strategy reflects this model. “Qatar’s AI strategy is a product of this nexus. It combines academic expertise with government vision, ensuring that innovation is both credible and implementable,” he said. He stressed that credibility is a critical factor in adoption: “When government collaborates with academia, it signals to society that solutions are not only innovative but also trustworthy. This builds confidence and accelerates uptake.”  During the panel discussion, moderated by Ibtechar co-founder and CEO Nayef al Ibrahim, Dimitropoulos was joined by Hissa al-Tamimi, director of the Government Innovation Department at the Civil Service and Government Development Bureau (CGB); Eman al-Kuwari, director of Digital Innovation at the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT); and Nejoud M al-Jehani, executive director of Strategy & Programmes at the Qatar Research, Development and Innovation (QRDI) Council.  Providing further insight during the discussion, al-Kuwari described how the Tasmu Innovation Lab helps government entities test emerging technologies before rollout, while al-Jehani described government as both adopter and enabler, shaping the innovation ecosystem by acting as a first customer. Al-Tamimi, meanwhile, highlighted the role of government accelerators in embedding an innovation culture and improving Qatar’s global innovation ranking.

The threat to the dollar’s primacy is not a rival currency, but the possibility that the global financial infrastructure will evolve in ways that dilute the advantages of openness, including the network effects that make holding and settling in dollars attractive.
Opinion

Will dollar dominance survive digital money?

Twice in the last century, the foundations of global finance shifted, because the burden placed on the machinery of money became unsustainable. Today, we are witnessing another shift, driven by the rise of stablecoins, tokenized deposits, and central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). But, this time, change is not unfolding through treaties or exchange-rate policies. The question is no longer which central bank issues the global monetary system’s “anchor” asset, but on whose infrastructure value circulates.When Allied countries agreed in 1944 to establish a post-World War II global monetary architecture based on US economic might and a gold-backed dollar, governments accepted limits on their monetary sovereignty in exchange for stable exchange rates and a reliable supply of global liquidity, provided by the United States.As capital markets deepened, however, the Bretton Woods system became untenable. In 1971, the US abandoned dollar convertibility to gold, and the world shifted to a dollar-based floating exchange-rate regime, which was flexible enough for an increasingly integrated global economy and complex financial system, but also fragile and prone to recurrent crises. Nonetheless, the US dollar retained its dominance in international transactions and reserves, thanks to the depth and safety of US Treasury markets, the global reach of US finance, and the credibility of US institutions.Today, the structure of the global economy has changed: China is now the world’s largest trader; the eurozone is a major capital exporter; and emerging economies, such as India and the Asean countries, are central to supply chains and key sources of energy demand. But while the economy has shifted toward multipolarity, the monetary system remains largely unipolar. The dollar still accounts for roughly half of cross-border loans, some 60% of global foreign-exchange reserves, and over 50% of trade invoicing. It is also the currency against which nearly all stablecoins now in circulation are pegged.The resulting structural mismatch has far-reaching consequences, as countries worldwide – even those that have established themselves as global production hubs – remain exposed to US monetary cycles, periodic dollar shortages, and asymmetric shocks.These vulnerabilities are systemic, not episodic, reflected in the global funding gaps that occurred in 2008 with the onset of the global financial crisis, in 2020 during the Covid-19 pandemic, and in 2022 when the US Federal Reserve began raising interest rates to combat inflation. Imbalances were managed, but never resolved.The rise of digital money may now break this stalemate. The critical innovation here is not the currencies themselves, but rather the underlying settlement layers. Tokenized assets, programmable payments, and upgraded messaging frameworks enable states and private actors to build alternative infrastructure capable of circumventing legacy intermediaries. Properly designed, these monetary rails can underpin a stable open system, expanding access, reducing friction, and modernizing the world’s aging financial infrastructure.But there is another, less desirable possibility: this new monetary architecture can entrench a bipolar system, comprising competing geopolitical blocs with incompatible standards. This explains why digital-currency projects have become instruments of geopolitics. China’s cross-border CBDC pilots are as much about shaping governance norms as they are about improving efficiency. Europe’s pursuit of “digital sovereignty” is rooted in security concerns, stemming from America’s apparent unreliability as a partner. Emerging economies are building new clearing arrangements outside traditional dollar channels. Meanwhile, privately issued stablecoins are forcing governments to rethink how influence is exerted.Technology is thus achieving what politics has not: a bottom-up realignment of monetary power. The US still has the potential to lead, because its institutions remain the most trusted, its capital markets the deepest, and its reserve-asset ecosystem the strongest. But fulfilling this potential will depend as much on architecture as on assets. The threat to the dollar’s primacy is not a rival currency, but the possibility that the global financial infrastructure will evolve in ways that dilute the advantages of openness, including the network effects that make holding and settling in dollars attractive.To retain its position at the centre of the global monetary system, the US must help build the rails that will convey global liquidity in the digital era. This means upgrading domestic and cross-border payment infrastructure for interoperability, thereby avoiding digital Balkanization. It also means providing regulatory clarity on dollar-denominated stablecoins and tokenized bank liabilities, so that private actors are not conducting quasi-central-bank functions without safeguards. And it means advancing a multilateral governance framework that ensures that cross-border digital rails reflect the principles that made the post-1970s system resilient: openness, transparency, and trustworthy governance.Such a system is in everyone’s interest. For Europe and China, modernized digital-payment rails would enable greater monetary autonomy without the disadvantages of fragmentation. For emerging economies, they would provide a credible path to reducing exposure to external shocks.And for the US, they would strengthen supply-chain resilience, forestall reliance on rival digital ecosystems, and enhance investment competitiveness by making dollar assets programmable and attractive as collateral.Moreover, embedding trusted digital-identity and compliance standards into the global financial plumbing would extend US influence in commercial diplomacy and economic statecraft.An open, interoperable, standards-based monetary order could finally deliver what neither the Bretton Woods system nor the floating exchange-rate regime could simultaneously: liquidity, stability, and sovereignty. -- Project SyndicateSilvia Sgherri is a visiting scholar and adjunct professor at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. 


The threat to the dollar’s primacy is not a rival currency, but the possibility that the global financial infrastructure will evolve in ways that dilute the advantages of openness, including the network effects that make holding and settling in dollars attractive.
Opinion

Will dollar dominance survive digital money?

Twice in the last century, the foundations of global finance shifted, because the burden placed on the machinery of money became unsustainable. Today, we are witnessing another shift, driven by the rise of stablecoins, tokenised deposits, and central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). But, this time, change is not unfolding through treaties or exchange-rate policies. The question is no longer which central bank issues the global monetary system’s “anchor” asset, but on whose infrastructure value circulates.When Allied countries agreed in 1944 to establish a post-World War II global monetary architecture based on US economic might and a gold-backed dollar, governments accepted limits on their monetary sovereignty in exchange for stable exchange rates and a reliable supply of global liquidity, provided by the United States.As capital markets deepened, however, the Bretton Woods system became untenable. In 1971, the US abandoned dollar convertibility to gold, and the world shifted to a dollar-based floating exchange-rate regime, which was flexible enough for an increasingly integrated global economy and complex financial system, but also fragile and prone to recurrent crises. Nonetheless, the US dollar retained its dominance in international transactions and reserves, thanks to the depth and safety of US Treasury markets, the global reach of US finance, and the credibility of US institutions.Today, the structure of the global economy has changed: China is now the world’s largest trader; the eurozone is a major capital exporter; and emerging economies, such as India and the Asean countries, are central to supply chains and key sources of energy demand. But while the economy has shifted toward multipolarity, the monetary system remains largely unipolar. The dollar still accounts for roughly half of cross-border loans, some 60% of global foreign-exchange reserves, and over 50% of trade invoicing. It is also the currency against which nearly all stablecoins now in circulation are pegged.The resulting structural mismatch has far-reaching consequences, as countries worldwide – even those that have established themselves as global production hubs – remain exposed to US monetary cycles, periodic dollar shortages, and asymmetric shocks.These vulnerabilities are systemic, not episodic, reflected in the global funding gaps that occurred in 2008 with the onset of the global financial crisis, in 2020 during the Covid-19 pandemic, and in 2022 when the US Federal Reserve began raising interest rates to combat inflation. Imbalances were managed, but never resolved.The rise of digital money may now break this stalemate. The critical innovation here is not the currencies themselves, but rather the underlying settlement layers. Tokenised assets, programmable payments, and upgraded messaging frameworks enable states and private actors to build alternative infrastructure capable of circumventing legacy intermediaries. Properly designed, these monetary rails can underpin a stable open system, expanding access, reducing friction, and modernising the world’s aging financial infrastructure.But there is another, less desirable possibility: this new monetary architecture can entrench a bipolar system, comprising competing geopolitical blocs with incompatible standards. This explains why digital-currency projects have become instruments of geopolitics. China’s cross-border CBDC pilots are as much about shaping governance norms as they are about improving efficiency. Europe’s pursuit of “digital sovereignty” is rooted in security concerns, stemming from America’s apparent unreliability as a partner. Emerging economies are building new clearing arrangements outside traditional dollar channels. Meanwhile, privately issued stablecoins are forcing governments to rethink how influence is exerted.Technology is thus achieving what politics has not: a bottom-up realignment of monetary power. The US still has the potential to lead, because its institutions remain the most trusted, its capital markets the deepest, and its reserve-asset ecosystem the strongest. But fulfilling this potential will depend as much on architecture as on assets. The threat to the dollar’s primacy is not a rival currency, but the possibility that the global financial infrastructure will evolve in ways that dilute the advantages of openness, including the network effects that make holding and settling in dollars attractive.To retain its position at the centre of the global monetary system, the US must help build the rails that will convey global liquidity in the digital era. This means upgrading domestic and cross-border payment infrastructure for interoperability, thereby avoiding digital Balkanisation. It also means providing regulatory clarity on dollar-denominated stablecoins and tokenised bank liabilities, so that private actors are not conducting quasi-central-bank functions without safeguards. And it means advancing a multilateral governance framework that ensures that cross-border digital rails reflect the principles that made the post-1970s system resilient: openness, transparency, and trustworthy governance.Such a system is in everyone’s interest. For Europe and China, modernised digital-payment rails would enable greater monetary autonomy without the disadvantages of fragmentation. For emerging economies, they would provide a credible path to reducing exposure to external shocks.And for the US, they would strengthen supply-chain resilience, forestall reliance on rival digital ecosystems, and enhance investment competitiveness by making dollar assets programmable and attractive as collateral.Moreover, embedding trusted digital-identity and compliance standards into the global financial plumbing would extend US influence in commercial diplomacy and economic statecraft.An open, interoperable, standards-based monetary order could finally deliver what neither the Bretton Woods system nor the floating exchange-rate regime could simultaneously: liquidity, stability, and sovereignty. - Project Syndicatel Silvia Sgherri is a visiting scholar and adjunct professor at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.

A woman shows her inked finger after casting her vote at a polling station during the first phase of Myanmar's general election in Naypyidaw on December 28, 2025. (AFP)
International

Weak turnout seen in Myanmar's phased election

Under the shadow of civil war ‌and questions over the poll's credibility, the initial round of Myanmar's phased general election closed Sunday, with signs of low ‌voter turnout for the first polls since a ‍military coup in 2021.The junta, having crushed pro-democracy protests after the coup and sparked a nationwide rebellion, said the vote would bring political stability to the impoverished Southeast Asian nation, despite ⁠international condemnation of the exercise.The United Nations, some Western countries ⁠and human rights groups have said the vote is not free, fair or credible, given that anti-junta political parties are out of the ‍running and it is illegal to criticise the polls.**media[398690]**Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi, deposed by the military months after her National League for Democracy won a general election landslide in 2020, remains in detention and the party she led to power has been dissolved.The military-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party, led by retired generals and fielding one-fifth of all candidates against severely diminished competition, is set to return to power, said Lalita Hanwong, a lecturer and Myanmar expert at Thailand's Kasetsart University."The junta's election is designed to prolong the military's power of slavery over people," she said. "And USDP and other allied parties with the military will join forces ‌to form the next government."**media[398693]**In the lacklustre canvassing ahead of the polls, the USDP was the most visible. Founded in 2010, the year it won an election boycotted by the opposition, the party ran the country in concert with its military backers until 2015, when it was swept away by Suu Kyi's NLD.Voter turnout in Sunday's polls appeared ⁠much lower than in the 2020 ‌election, 10 residents of cities spread across Myanmar said.Further rounds of voting will be held on January 11 and January 25, covering 265 of Myanmar's 330 townships, although the junta does not have complete control of all those areas.Armed groups formed in the wake of the coup and long-established ethnic armies are fighting the military across swathes of the country, displacing some 3.6mn people and creating one of Asia's worst humanitarian crises.**media[398691]**A date for the final election result has not been declared.Dressed in civilian clothes, junta chief Min Aung Hlaing voted in the heavily guarded capital city of Naypyitaw, then held up an ink-soaked little finger, smiling widely, footage on state media MRTV showed. Voters must dip a finger into indelible ink after casting a ballot to ensure they do not vote more than once.Asked by reporters if he would like to become the country's president, an office that analysts say he has ambitions for, the general said he was not the leader of any political party."When the parliament convenes, there is a process for electing ​the president," he said.The junta's attempt to establish a stable administration in the midst of war is fraught with risk, and broad foreign recognition is unlikely for any military-controlled government with a civilian veneer, according to ⁠analysts.Tom Andrews, the UN special envoy for human rights ‍in Myanmar, said Sunday the election was not a pathway out of the country's crisis and must be strongly rejected.Zaw Min Tun, a junta spokesperson, acknowledged international criticism of the vote."However, from this election, there will be political stability," he told reporters after voting in Naypyitaw. "We believe there will be a better future."Nevertheless, Myanmar's voters did not come out in numbers close to the previous election conducted under Covid-19 restrictions, including in the commercial capital of Yangon and the central city of Mandalay, residents said.The junta's legal framework for the election has no minimum voter turnout requirement, said the ​Asian Network for Free Elections poll monitoring group.Turnout was about 70% in Myanmar's 2020 and 2015 general elections, according to the US-based nonprofit International Foundation for Electoral Systems.There has been none of the energy and excitement of previous election campaigns, although several residents in Myanmar's largest cities who spoke to Reuters did not report any coercion by the military administration to push people to vote.A handful of polling booths in Yangon, some of them near areas housing military families, had dozens of voters queued up around midday, but others were largely empty, according to two residents of the sprawling metropolis."It isn't as loud and enthusiastic as it was back in 2020," said a Mandalay resident, asking not to be named because of security concerns.The streets of Hakha, capital of the northern state of Chin, where fighting rages on, were empty after a local ⁠rebel group told residents to boycott the vote, two residents said."People from my quarter, none of us went to vote," said one of them, a 63-year-old man. "We are not interested in the election." 


Ugandan doctors attend the contacts of a patient who had tested positive, during the launch of the vaccination for the Sudan strain of Ebola virus, with a trial vaccine at the Mulago Guest House (Isolation centre) in Kampala, Uganda, on February 3, 2025. (Reuters/File photo)
Opinion

Global health workers strengthen US national security

Last December, while visiting Nairobi for a global health workshop, I met a group of community health workers, the frontline professionals who play a vital role in providing HIV, tuberculosis, and maternal health services across Africa. They talked about navigating informal settlements to reach patients who missed appointments; building trust one conversation at a time; and knowing the ins and outs of their catchment area, including which children are orphaned, which traditional healers collaborate on referrals, and which patients struggle with adherence. Their expertise was largely developed in programmes funded by the President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR), which US President George W Bush launched in 2003. By training and supporting community health workers, the programme has helped strengthen the continent’s healthcare systems. But these workers do more than deliver healthcare: they also function as an early-warning system for the next pandemic – a crucial role that directly benefits the US. But US policymakers seem to have overlooked this, at least judging by the America First Global Health Strategy that the US Department of State released in September. It sets the ambitious goal of achieving the 95-95-95 targets (whereby 95% of HIV-infected people know their status, 95% of those who know are in treatment, and 95% of those being treated are virally suppressed). The strategy also aims to reduce both tuberculosis mortality and malaria mortality by 90% by 2030, and to detect epidemic outbreaks within seven days and mobilise a response within 72 hours of detection. At the same time, to end the system’s “inefficiencies, waste, and dependency” (a major theme in the current US administration, which has already eliminated billions of dollars in foreign aid), the strategy calls for shifting 270,000 frontline health-care workers from US-funded NGO programmes to recipient government payrolls starting in 2027. The problem is that PEPFAR-funded healthcare workers typically earn significantly more than their government counterparts, often requiring salary harmonisation when transitioning to government employment. In Malawi, nurses with international NGOs that are supported by PEPFAR have long earned a notably higher median salary than nurses with local NGOs. In South Africa, absorbing 24,264 PEPFAR-funded workers would cost the government R2.82bn ($167mn) – and even that represents only 63% of what PEPFAR currently spends on salaries, illustrating the compensation gap workers face during transition. When faced with deep salary cuts, workers are likely to flee rural public health for better-paying jobs in urban clinics or other NGOs. This reveals a fundamental tension in the strategy: it seeks to maintain robust disease surveillance while effectively dismantling the workforce responsible for it. The section on pandemic preparedness, correctly identified as a core national interest, is telling. It touts the US government’s proactive efforts to stop significant outbreaks of Ebola in Uganda and Marburg in Tanzania, celebrating that “zero cases reached American shores.” But there is no discussion of how this system works, particularly its dependence on the health workers now at risk. PEPFAR infrastructure was essential to the rapid containment of Uganda’s Ebola outbreak in 2022-23: the programme’s transport system for HIV samples was repurposed for haemorrhagic fever samples, while local partners leveraged their relationships with clinics to educate more people about infection prevention and control. Likewise, during the Covid-19 pandemic, PEPFAR-supported laboratory sites across Africa performed testing, and community health workers applied their strategies for HIV contact tracing to surveillance of the outbreak. The 208,800 community health workers who are the PEPFAR programme’s eyes and ears are the first to notice unusual disease patterns, report unexplained illness clusters, and relay community signals to national surveillance teams. Lose them and America’s early-warning capacity collapses. Responding to outbreaks where they originate is cheaper and safer than waiting until they reach America. Covid-19, after all, cost the US economy trillions of dollars and killed more than 1mn Americans. In view of this, PEPFAR’s annual budget of around $6bn is hardly excessive; rather, it is a high-return investment in national security. The US strategy aims to complete bilateral agreements by Dec 31 and begin implementation by April, giving policymakers a three-month window. But government employment processes typically require two years to navigate budget approvals, create positions, recruit competitive candidates, and set salaries. Uganda’s successful health-worker transition followed a similar timeline. Rushing the handover risks triggering a mass exodus. The US government has promised to employ dedicated staff members in each country to focus on validating and auditing surveillance data. But without community health workers to conduct contact tracing during disease outbreaks and maintain the community trust required for rapid case identification, there will be no data to process. To be sure, the strategy identifies a major problem: less than 40% of PEPFAR funding goes to frontline supplies and healthcare workers. Reforms are clearly needed. But there is a difference between a thoughtful transition and a rapid dismantling. Continuity of institutional knowledge is crucial, and Congress should require the State Department to set realistic timelines that match administrative realities and develop comprehensive workforce transition plans that include terms for retention bonuses and severance packages. Bilateral agreements should include binding commitments from recipient governments to maintain pandemic-surveillance capacity regardless of domestic political pressures. Most importantly, policymakers must understand that 270,000 healthcare workers are more than a line item; they are the backbone of the disease-surveillance system protecting American lives. The same community health workers testing for HIV today will test for tomorrow’s novel pathogen. The trust they build with marginalised populations now will be essential for vaccine uptake during the next outbreak. Funding the people who help keep Americans safe should not be seen as charity, but rather as spending that serves Americans’ own interest in staying healthy. — Project Syndicate Junaid Nabi, a physician and scientist, is a senior fellow at the Aspen Institute and a Millennium Fellow at the Atlantic Council.  

The People's Bank of China headquarters in Beijing. China’s central bank reaffirmed its supportive monetary policy stance while signalling continued caution toward aggressive stimulus, reinforcing a shift toward securing long-term stability over immediate fixes.
Business

China’s central bank signals steady, cautious support for growth

China’s central bank reaffirmed its supportive monetary policy stance while signalling continued caution toward aggressive stimulus, reinforcing a shift toward securing long-term stability over immediate fixes.The People’s Bank of China (PBoC) vowed to guide borrowing costs to continue hovering at a low level, according to a Wednesday statement following its fourth-quarter monetary policy committee meeting. The bank repeated a pledge to step up “cross-cyclical” policies, a phrase suggesting it aims to look beyond short-term volatility and avoid excessive stimulus that could create structural imbalances.The statement didn’t mention a reduction in interest rates or to the reserve requirement ratio, which determines how much cash banks must keep in reserves, while the PBoC pledged to make use of multiple policy tools. That suggests the central bank is cautious about taking those big easing steps, even after a readout following a key annual economic work conference included a reference to those measures earlier this month.The language suggests “a preference toward a reactive rather than proactive approach to easing,” Goldman Sachs Group Inc economist Xinquan Chen said in a note Thursday. Changes in the language “point to a more cautious and flexible approach to monetary policy easing”, he said.This measured approach comes despite deepening weakness in domestic demand, with retail sales last month expanding at the lowest pace since the crash caused by Covid. Fixed-asset investment is also on track for its first annual decline in data going back to 1998, after a crash made worse by a drought in funding for infrastructure projects.The committee said it will “grasp the strength, pace and timing” of policy implementation based on evolving domestic and overseas conditions. The PBoC also reiterated its commitment to maintaining the yuan’s basic stability at a reasonable and balanced level to guard against overshooting risks.The PBoC has adopted a cautious approach this year, frequently disappointing economists who had anticipated more aggressive interest rate cuts. This restraint reflects the central bank’s deeper concerns over protecting shrinking bank margins and preserving policy space for future downturns.While the meeting readout mentioned maintaining “ample” liquidity, the focus on “quality and efficiency” over raw volume suggests that any further easing will be mostly targeted.The PBoC will likely cut the RRR by 50 basis points in the first quarter to maintain ample liquidity and ensure government borrowing costs stay low, economists at China Galaxy Securities Co wrote in a report on Thursday.While it may cut the policy interest rate by 10 to 20 basis points in 2026, any reduction may only be triggered by an increase in economic pressure, such as a deterioration in the US-China relationship or worsening unemployment, they said.

Gulf Times
Opinion

A model to keep multilateralism alive

Few would deny that there has been a shift away from multilateral co-operation in recent years. As the world becomes more multipolar, geopolitical tensions are hampering efforts to devise common solutions to shared problems, and rising nationalism and fiscal crises within many traditional donor countries are threatening the institutions on which multilateralism depends.As a realist, I recognize that today’s world is more dangerous than the one we inhabited not so long ago. But I am also confident that possibilities for long-term global collaboration remain. I have seen firsthand that multilateral co-operation often delivers results that otherwise would not be attained. My confidence stems from my experience as the chair of Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance. As my five-year tenure draws to a close, I find myself reflecting on what has underpinned Gavi’s success over the past 25 years and what this experience can teach us about adapting multilateralism for a rapidly changing world.The first lesson may sound simple, but it is too often forgotten: Always be mission-driven. Gavi exists to save lives and protect health by expanding access to vaccines in lower-income countries. It is this clarity of purpose that has helped halve child mortality in 78 countries and protect every one of us against the threat of infectious diseases. Nor is there any secret to our success. We have done it by uniting a multitude of public and private stakeholders, many with divergent interests, behind a common purpose.Gavi has always been a coalition of the willing, bringing together national governments, United Nations agencies, philanthropies, vaccine manufacturers, innovators, development banks, research institutions, and civil society. With its diverse skill set, expertise, and political clout, it has protected over half the world’s children against preventable diseases in any given year, as well as providing the world with core competencies during crises like the Covid-19 pandemic, when we led the global vaccine response.In a more multipolar world, similar approaches will be needed to drive progress in other areas where the provision of public goods (conflict resolution, education, health security, equitable access to AI) is too important to be held hostage by adversarial politics and sectional interests.That leads me to the second key lesson: Be mission-driven, but country-led. Gavi was founded in the spirit of partnership, not paternalism. Promoting national self-reliance has always been at the heart of its mission. Countries pay more toward the cost of their vaccine programs as their national incomes rise, up to the point where they can fully sustain their own immunization services. Some countries have even transitioned from recipients to donors.This responsiveness to country needs has made us relentlessly focused on innovation. In 2024, Gavi embraced the historic introduction of malaria vaccines because we recognized how unjust it was that so many countries, particularly in Africa, had to wait so long for such a breakthrough. The same year, Gavi also launched a financial innovation, the First Response Fund, to provide surge financing for the procurement of mpox vaccines, saving precious time that otherwise would have been lost raising additional funding.Today, Gavi is directing the same innovative zeal toward the future rollout of vaccines against tuberculosis, the world’s deadliest infectious disease. It is also advancing a new initiative, the African Vaccine Manufacturing Accelerator, with strong backing from the European Union and other donors, to support the African Union’s ambitions for regional high-value manufacturing. I predict we will see a far greater role for, and collaboration between, regional economic and political blocs as the key drivers of multilateralism in the years ahead.Every coalition needs strong governance and leadership. That is why Nelson Mandela was chosen as Gavi’s first chair. But ensuring that the interests of every stakeholder remain aligned is no simple task, and this insight was not lost on me when I was approached for the role in 2020. I was honoured, and I could not help noticing that the Gavi board had 28 seats, the same number of member states whose interests I sought to align when I was president of the European Commission.Throughout my tenure at Gavi, I have been guided by the enduring wisdom of Jean Monnet, a leading postwar advocate of European unity: “Nothing is possible without people, but nothing lasts without institutions.” Gavi is truly a unique institution. Not only is it a broad, inclusive alliance of national and international, as well as public and private, entities; it is also an international organization that has managed to avoid paralysis and inertia, unlike some major intergovernmental bodies. It has done so by maintaining a laser focus on protecting children – even in war zones where the only respite from fighting came from the need to vaccinate populations.Countries will always have reasons to disagree, but if anything can elevate the cause of peace above extreme national interest or ideology, it is the protection of children. Throughout my life, I have been at the heart of many seismic changes, from the Carnation Revolution in my native Portugal in the 1970s to the effort to advance peace, reconciliation, and democracy in Europe (for which I had the great honour of receiving the Nobel Peace Prize on behalf of the EU). In each case, historic changes needed a catalyst, which is exactly the role that Gavi has played in promoting public health.As we enter a more multipolar world, I would urge everyone to recognize the need for more mission-driven public-private partnerships like Gavi. There simply is no better way to address the challenges of our age.Jose Manuel Barroso, a former president of the European Commission and former prime minister of Portugal, is Chair of the Board of Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance.