Serious deficit in German politics

Few people outside Germany are familiar with the caricature ofthemselves that many Germans hold in their minds. Far from theaggressive bully of 20th-century war propaganda, the perfectionistengineer of Madison Avenue car advertisements, or the rule-followingknow-it-all of the silver screen, the German many picture today is asleepy-headed character clad in nightgown and cap. Sometimes clutching acandle, this German cuts a naive, forlorn figure, bewildered by thesurrounding world.This figure is not new. On the contrary, referred to as “Der deutscheMichel” or “the German Michel,” it was popularised in the 19th centuryas a character whose limited perspective causes him to shun great ideas,eschew change, and aspire only to a decent, quiet, and comfortablelife.But Michel has now made a comeback. And who can blame him? Germany nowboasts a booming economy, near full employment, rising wages, andcontent unions. The financial crisis is long forgotten, public budgetsare under control; and the 2015 influx of migrants has been relativelywell managed.What bad news there is – industrial scandals (like that at Volkswagen),airline bankruptcies, endlessly delayed infrastructure projects – doeslittle to dampen the general sense of safety and well-being enjoyed byGermany’s Michels. The only real threat, it seems, is the world outsideGermany’s borders.In this sense, last autumn’s election campaign was perfectly suited toGermany’s Michels. “A land where we live well and happily,” the campaignslogan of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU),resonated with them, as did the rather provincial and mostly emptymessages of rival parties. With the exception of the right-wing populistAlternative fur Deutschland (AfD), the parties displayed a rotecivility and drowsy acceptance of consensus that pacified theelectorate.After the election, the real politicking began, but even then, painswere taken to obscure those activities from Germany’s Michels. Indeed,though party officials had been in place for some time, they waiteduntil the votes were cast before putting their cards on the table, andeven then did so behind closed doors. Even the leaks from theseclosed-door coalition talks were so well managed that they created theillusion that the “Sondierungsgesprache” – that is, the preparatorytalks among party officials – were politically rather harmless.But Germany’s political class, like its ordinary Michels, are in denial.The soporific federal elections, the breakdown of coalition talks amongthe CDU, its Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union (CSU),the Greens, and the Free Democrats (FDP), and the timid dance betweenthe CDU and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) since then all point to aserious deficit in German politics.  The truth is that the various party platforms, meant to inform theelectorate and provide a basis for coalition talks, reveal a shockinglack of imagination and paucity of new ideas. Second-order issues arepresented as red lines, with largely technical questions – for example,about refugee family reunions, a new health insurance scheme no oneasked for (Burgerversicherung), or the role of the federal government infunding education – taking centre stage.Considering the state of Europe and the world – and the hopes manyoutsiders are pinning on German leadership – these issues seem rathermarginal. But the real problem is that they are distracting from largerissues relating to, say, the euro, security and defence, migration,infrastructure, and taxation.Lacking any forward-looking political visions, German politics hasdegenerated to tactical plays being carried out by established players.The CDU, in a War of the Roses with the CSU, can live neither with orwithout Merkel, while the SPD is unsure of itself and fears furtherpolitical decline. None of this bodes well for a country whoseparliament has already been diminished, after these three parties,during their eight years forming a coalition government, marginalisedthe opposition and failed to build up new leadership cadres. Coalition agreements in Germany have always been elaborate documents of aquasi-contractual nature. But there is a growing tendency to plan outfour years of governing, with leaders then using legislative periods notto debate laws, but rather to enact previously agreed policies.Moreover, no major reform has been successfully implemented in Germanysince the 2000s, when Chancellor Gerhard Schroder pushed throughlabour-market reforms. No forward-looking reforms of the calibre ofSchroder’s Agenda 2010 were even attempted under Merkel in over adecade.The CDU/CSU and the SPD are now pursuing a grand coalition that wouldkeep Germany roughly on the same path as the last eight years. And, infact, the 28-page agreement that will allow formal coalition talks toproceed is overly detailed, technocratic, unambitious, and lacks vision.It is thus unsurprising that, though CDU/CSU and SPD negotiators havecelebrated the deal as a breakthrough, many, especially in the SPD, areunhappy with the outcome, with some calling for a renegotiation. The SPDnow faces a choice: at its upcoming special party congress thisweekend, its leaders must decide whether to join yet another grandcoalition government that promises more of the same or move intoopposition, probably triggering new elections.But there is another option, which many have ignored: a CDU-led minoritygovernment, with Merkel as chancellor. Freed of stifling coalitionagreements with a reluctant SPD or a coldly calculating FDP, Merkelcould choose her cabinet based on competence and vision, rather thanparty politics. She could even appoint ministers from other parties.Most important, Merkel could finally tackle the important issues thathave fallen by the wayside in recent years, to which the currentcoalition agreement pays only lip service. This means cooperating withFrench President Emmanuel Macron to move the European project forward;modernising Germany’s public administration system; preparing the labourforce for digitisation; and tackling immigration issues. Parliament is integral to success on any of these fronts. Mainstreamparties must embrace the kind of open and constructive debate thatnurtured parliamentary democracy in Germany’s early years, rather thanremaining focused on political tactics.Michel may prefer the modest policy initiatives and incrementalism thathave characterised Merkel’s chancellorships. But a minority governmentforced to muster coalitions of the willing to address the criticalissues confronting Germany and Europe could escape the constraints ofMichel’s expectations, freeing German politics from party tacticians andenabling real and much-needed reform. In other words, the modicum ofpolitical insecurity Germany faces today may well be just what thecountry needs to give rise to new ideas and voices, and a better future.– Project Syndicate* Helmut K Anheier is president and professor of Sociology at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin.